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We compare the effects of optimal tariffs on the technology choice of exporters
under the discriminatory tariffs regime and the 'Most Favored Nation (MFN)" clause. It is
shown that a lower marginal cost (MC) technology will be chosen in equilibrium under the
"MFN" clause. As a result, importing country's long-run welfare increases with the
adoption of "MFN" while exporting countries' welfare decreases in most cases.
However, ex post technology choice, the importing country prefers discriminatory tariffs.
This result, therefore, highlights the role of "MFN" as a commitment mechanism to resolve
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I. Introduction
This paper investigates the effect of rent-extracting strategic trade policy on the
technology choice and henceforth long-run performance of the economy. We are
especially interested in how the equilibrium technology choice can be affected by the
uniform tariffs requirement mandated by an international agreement such as the "Most
Favored Nation (MFN)" clause.
It has been relatively well known that import tariffs can improve domestic welfare
by extracting rent if foreign firms are engaged in an oligopolistic competition [see, for
example, Brander and Spencer (1984) and Krugman and Helpman (1989)]. Recently,
Gatsios (1990) and Hwang and Mai (1991) investigated the optimal discriminatory tariffs if
two foreign firms are located in two different countries. In a static context where cost
structures of producers are given exogenously, they demonstrate that importing countries
generally prefer to impose discriminatory or preferential tariffs across different countries
rather than uniform tariffs.1 The result is hardly surprising since importing countries are to
have two instruments with discriminatory tariffs compared to one instrument with uniform
tariffs. A more interesting result is that the tariff on the low-cost producer should be higher
than that on the high-cost producer. Therefore, with discriminatory tariffs, the effective
cost (production cost plus specific tariff) differential between producers will become
smaller; the effect of optimal discriminatory tariffs is ex post reduction in comparative
advantage for the cost-efficient firm. In terms of production efficiency, production is
diverted from the more efficient to the less efficient firm. The consequences of mandated
uniform tariffs such as the "Most Favored Nation" (MFN) principle will be an overall
production efficiency with distributional effects favoring cost-efficient countries.
Rather than taking the technology as given, we endogenize the cost level by
assuming that it is a result of costly investments, like R&D, by forward-looking and
"•Uniform tariffs will have no welfare loss for the domestic country only when two producers have
the same cost structure.
optimizing agents. We explore long-run consequences of active trade policy, namely, how
the pursuit of rent-extraction can affect the long-run choice of technology by producers.
We show that a lower marginal cost (MC) technology will be chosen under the MFN
clause. The intuition is as follows. With the MFN clause, the effective cost differential
remains the same as the production cost differential since importing countries are required
to impose the same tariffs across countries. In contrast, under the discriminatory tariffs
regime, we demonstrate that the importing country's tariff will respond more adversely
against the rival firm in the other country when one firm's cost increases. Therefore,
optimal tariffs in the discriminatory regime is an equalizer in the effective cost differential.
In the symmetric equilibria that we focus on, two producers achieve the same MC and are
treated equally even in the discriminatory tariffs regime. However, the mere possibility of
different tariffs will affect the equilibrium MC they will reach under the discriminatory
tariffs regime. It will be higher than the one they reach under the MFN clause. When the
cost advantage is not exogenous, as in Gatsios (1990), and only is achieved by costly
investment, the comparative advantage gap reducing effect of discriminatory tariffs will
undermine the incentive of producers to cut the cost levels. Consequently, ex ante, the
importing country will benefit from the uniform tariffs, even though, ex post,
discriminatory tariffs are mostly preferred. Another way of paraphrasing this is that the
importing country faces a time-inconsistency problem. An MFN clause can provide a
natural way to precommit to uniform tariffs for the importing country. In contrast, the
welfares of the exporting countries in most cases are reduced as a consequence of intense
competition at the technology choice stage under MFN.
Our paper also relates to the work of DeGraba (1990) who addressed the same
issues in the domestic context. He explored the long-run consequences of an upstream
monopolist's third-degree price discrimination in input markets on the downstream
producers' technology choice using linear demand and quadratic relationship between
marginal cost and fixed cost
Section II presents a three stage game where an active tariffs policy and a
subsequent Cournot output game are preceded by the long-run technology choice by
producers, thus endogenizing the cost of producers. We analyze the effect of the MFN
clause on the technology choice and resulting welfare for importing and exporting
countries. Section El applies the general model of section II to the linear demand case to
get an analytical solution. Concluding comments follow.
II. The Model
There are two firms located in two different foreign countries, 1 and 2. They can
produce a homogeneous product intended to sell in the Home market. For simplicity, we
assume that there is no producer of this product in the Home market and there is no
consumption of this product in foreign countries. Demand for this product in the Home
market is given by P(Q), where Q = qi+q2- We assume that P(.) is a decreasing and twice
continuously differential function, with P"(Q) Q + P'(Q) < 0.
We analyze the following three-stage game. In the first stage, each firm chooses its
technology, which determines its constant marginal cost q. There is a tradeoff between
marginal cost and sunk fixed cost. The relationship is represented by F = O(c). We
assume that O'<0 and <X>">0. That is, a lower marginal cost is achieved at the expense of a
higher sunk cost. We can think of F as an irreversible investment in cost reducing R&D.
In the second stage, after observing the choice of technology by each producer, the
importing country pursues an active trade policy of imposing tariffs on imports. Finally,
each firm competes in the domestic market in the Cournot fashion, given the cost level and
tariff in place. The timing structure reflects the fact that technology choice is largely
irreversible and the importing government cannot precommit to the specific level of tariffs.
We search for a subgame perfect equilibrium in this game. As usual, we apply backwards
induction and start with the third stage subgame.
Treating marginal cost c= (cj, C2) and tariff t = (tj, t2> as parameters, each firm
maximizes the following.
K
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The first order conditions are given by:
aV3qi = P'Qi + P - q - q = 0, i=l,2 (2)
By solving (2) simultaneously, we can derive the Coumot-Nash equilibrium
outputs as functions of c and t, q j(c, t) and q2(c, t). By totally differentiating (2), we get
the following comparative statics result.
dq{ dq{ P " q j + 2 P ' dq^ dq- P"qj+ P'
(3)
where M = ( P ^ +2P) (P"q2 +2P) - (P"q i + P')(P"q2 + P) = P P" Q + 3(P')2 > 0.
The increase in tariff imposed on products from country i (firm i ) will induce a reduction in
the output from the targeted country and an increase in output from the other country.
However, the effect on total output is negative, with the tariffs own effect dominating its
cross effect.
dti " 5 t i ~5tT ~ M = P " Q + 3P1 < 0 (4>
Domestic consumers are assumed to have utility functions that are quasi-linear in a
competitive numeraire good, enabling us to ignore any income effects. The government,
considering the effect of its tariff choices on the equilibrium output, sets tariffs to maximize
W (t; c) = u[Q(c, t)] - P[Q(c, t)]Q(c, t) + t ^ c , t) + t ^ c , t) (5)
•Q(c. t)
where u[Q(c, t)] = I P(z)dz.
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Using the fact that u1 = P, the first order conditions for the maximization problem
under the discriminatory tariff system are given by
3 3qo
^ 2 O , i = U (6)
Under MFN, the home government is required to set t j ^ . By writing a
Lagrangian function £ = W (t: c) + A,(tj - t^, the first order conditions are given by
£2 = W 2 ( t : c ) - X=0 (7)
It will be assumed that appropriate second order conditions are satisfied under both
regimes. Let tj*(c) and t2*(c) be the optimal tariffs under the preferential regime and
tj**(c) _ t2**(c) = t**(c) be the optimal tariffs under the MFN regime.
Finally, each firm makes its technology choice taking into account the future imposition of
tariffs and its effect on the final stage output game. By substituting derived optimal tariffs t(c)
above and resulting Cournot-Nash outputs q^c, t(c)] into equation (1), we get the reduced form
profit function, 7^[c; t (c)], as a function of marginal costs c=(Cj, c 2 ) . At the technology
adoption stage, each firm maximizes
n ^ c ; t (c)] = n{[c; t (c)] - O(Ci)
= [P(qi[c; t (c)] +q2[c; t (c)]) - Ci - q ] q i[c; t (c)] - O(Ci) (8)
Note that Ili denotes firm i's profit net of sunk investment cost Since two firms are symmetric ex
ante, we will subsequently concentrate on the symmetric solutions. The reduced profit functions,
7tj[c; t (c)l, are assumed to be concave in its own cost q , which, in turn, implies that IIj[c; t (c)]
are also concave in Cj due to the convexity of O(q). We further assume that there exists a pure
strategy equilibrium in the choice of technologies.
Under discriminatory tariffs regime, the first order conditions for Nash equilibrium
technology choice are given by
aft dn{ dn{ dv* dn{
Then, equation (9) defines continuous reaction functions Rj (CJ). To ensure uniqueness of
3211; 3 2 ] !
Nash equilibrium in the technology choice, we assume that I ^
 9 I > I ^ v. I.
dcp ocpt-j
Similarly, under MFN regime, the first order conditions are given by
aiL d d%: at** a^ at**
dt dC V VICj dCj dtj dCj dt:
Since two firms are assumed to be identical ex ante, the unique equilibrium is necessarily
symmetric in the choice of technology. Therefore, optimal tariffs will be the same across
countries, even in the discriminatory regime. However, it will be shown that the
possibility of different tariffs off the equilibrium under preferential tariffs regime will alter
strategic incentives for technology choices and will induce exporting producers to adopt a
different symmetric equilibrium from the one they adopt under MFN.
Proposition 1. Let c* and c** be the symmetric Nash equilibrium technology choices
under the discriminatory tariffs and the MFN clause, respectively. Then, c*>c**. That is,
a lower MC technology is adopted under the MFN clause. As a result, the MFN clause
increases the welfare of the importing country.
Proof. By comparing two first order conditions (9) and (10), it is immediate that at a
symmetric equilibrium, the condition for the firms to adopt to a lower MC technology is
given by
dn{ dl* dn{ dt* dn{ at**
+
"at dc{ lt ac at
3ti* du*
We prove this by demonstrating that condition (11) is equivalent to V— - -5-7— < 0.
aq* at-* at**
First, we claim that -^— + -^J— = 2 -5 . That is, the sum of changes of
tariffs in response to changes in the choice of technology is the same under both regimes.
However, in general, the distribution of the tariffs change will be uneven in the preferential
tariffs regime.
Since two firms are symmetric, ex ante, without loss of generality, we will take
at,* dt7*






























where H (the determinant of the Hessian matrix) =
 2 -.2 ~ dudti at?ati > 0»
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second order condition for the maximization. Note that the signs of •^L- and 3 ^ - are, in
general, ambiguous. However, we can prove that the effect of MC increase on the
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where H (the determinant of bordered Hessian) = - 3V 3V
(15)
> 0, by the
second order condition for the constrained maximization.
Since the tariffs across two countries will be also equalized at a symmetric
equilibrium, with c i - Q,^ even under preferential tariffs regime [see Gatsios (1991)],
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It can be easily verified that-^r— < 0 and-^-— > 0 by using the envelope theorem.
Therefore, the expression in the second parenthesis is negative. We complete the proof by
showing that the sign of the first parenthesis is also negative.
We note that
dt,* 3u* 3t2
3cj " 3c (17)
at? atl9t2
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By utilizing the fact that optimal tariffs across countries are equal (tj = i^ ) at the symmetric
equilibrium, even under discriminatory tariffs, and
equation(4)), < 0.
(to see this, differentiate
Q.E.D.
at,* at9*
Even though we can not say, a priori, the signs of -5-7- and -^- in isolation, we
have shown that the responses of discriminatory tariffs to one firm's MC increase have a
relatively more adverse effect on the rival firm. Consequently, when the importing country
cannot precommit to set tariffs equally across countries, exporting firms generally choose a
technology that has a higher marginal production cost, implying less output and a higher
price in the market place.
The long-run welfare effects of the MFN clause on the importing country can be






As a consequence, the importing country's welfare increases with the adoption of MFN as
a result of lower cost technology adoption by exporting countries.
The effect of the MFN clause on the welfare of exporting countries is ambiguous at
the most general level. However, in most cases, it is expected that MFN reduces the profit
by inducing more intense competition in the technology choice stage. Let J(c) = ITi(c,c) +
r y ^ c ) be the joint profit by firm 1 and 2 when both choose the same technology c. It is
assumed that J(c) is strictly concave. Let c° be the maximizer of J(c). Then, c° satisfies
the following first order condition.
d%: dK: dt* dK{ dt:* dlZ: dK: dt:* 371: 3t
The expression in the first square bracket is the effect of MC increase on its own operating
profit. The expression in the second bracket is the effect on the other firm's profit that is
not taken into account in the calculation of the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Whether
MFN clause will be preferred or not by the exporting countries will depend on the sign of
this externality. If MC increase of one firm has a total effect of positive externality on the
other firm, then c° > c* (>c**). In this case, the MFN clause will induce the technology
choice further from the joint-profit maximizing level and hurt the exporting countries.
OK:
Since the direct effect of MC increase on the other firm's profit, -*r+, is positive, the
dK:
sufficient condition for this is that the direct effect, -^r, dominates the induced effect from
dn: 3tj* Bit: 3k*
tariffs changes,3r J-3-— + 3 H - T T .
° dtj dCj dt: dcj
Proposition 2. If ^ — < 0, the exporting countries' profits decrease with the MFN
j 3)1: 3tj* d%: at;* 9jt; dtj* 3Hj dt,*
11
Since 3-^ > 0, --rr1- < 0, and the expression in the square bracket is positive by (14), the
J
 at:*
sufficient condition for the whole expression to be negative is ^ — < 0. Q.E.D.d C i
In a static model where technologies are given, Gatsios (1990) focuses on the
conflicting interests between developing and developed countries in the adoption of the
MFN clause. However, in his model, it is hard to see why the importing country will
adopt the MFN clause voluntarily without any side payments from the developed countries,
since the importing country suffers from the adoption of the MFN clause. By introducing
prior investment in R&D, we can resolve the apparently paradoxical phenomenon of why
an importing country accepts the MFN clause in spite of being in favor of a preferential
tariff system, given the cost levels of exporters.
In this paper, the raison d'etre for the MFN clause lies in the time-inconsistency
problem facing the importing country. Even though the uniform tariff is better than the
discriminatory one for the importing country before the choice of technology, it has
incentive to switch to the discriminatory one after the choice of technology has been made.
The discretionary power, ex post, actually hurts the importing country. The MNF clause
provides a mechanism for the importing country to precommit to uniform tariffs and
achieve a higher welfare.
III. An Example: Linear Demand
In this section, we demonstrate the general result of section II in a closed form by
using a linear demand. Let the inverse demand be given by P = a - bQ. Then, the
Cournot-Nash output and equilibrium profits in terms of costs and tariffs levels are given
by:
1 - 2c; - 2t; + c; + t;
qi <c> t) = -3^—]—s
(1 - 2q - 2t, + q + t;)2
n{ (c, t) = L — ^ ' "—, i=l, 2 and i*j
Optimal tariffs under preferential and uniform tariffs regimes are given by :
1 2
2a - 3q + c:
ti*(c) = j p L, i=l, 2 and i*j
2a - ci - Cot**(c) = f -
Therefore, Nash equilibrium choices in technology under the preferential tariff regime (c*), MFN
(c**), and joint profit maximizing choice (c°), satisfy the following first -order conditions,
respectively:
O'(c*) = - 3(a - c*)/16b
O'(c**) = - 5(a - c**)/16b
O'(c°) = - (a - c°)/8b
Therefore, c** < c* < c°.
With linear example, MFN is harmful for exporting countries2.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We presented a simple model examining how rent-extracting tariff policy can affect
exporting producers' choice of long-run technology. It was demonstrated that welfare
implications for the importing country vis-a-vis exporting countries can be quite different
from those derived in the static context treating the technology of exporters as given.
This paper also highlighted the dynamic inconsistency problem facing the country
importing a good produced by international oligopolists. Gatsios (1990) and Hwang and
Mai (1991) showed that given the cost level of producers, the importing country will have
incentive to impose discriminatory tariffs against cost -efficient producers. However, if we
analyze the effect of strategic tariff policy in the long-run time horizon in which cost level is
determined as a consequence of technology choice through costly investment, the
discriminatory tariffs will diminish the incentive to cut costs by exporters. Even though
discriminatory tariffs is ex post optimal, it can be ex ante inferior. The MFN clause can
2
 Even though the condition in proposition 2 is violated in our example, it is a sufficient, not a
necessary, condition for the adverse effect of MFN on exporting countries. Therefore, the
example is not inconsistent with proposition 2.
1 3
be viewed as a precommitment mechanism to uniform tariffs by the importing country.
The result also provides a caution in the policy debate on the merits of the MFN.
The discard of the MFN by an importing country can be beneficial in the short-run. The
adverse long-run effect can be more grave, outweighing the short-run gain.
1 4
References
Brander, J. and B. Spencer, 1984, Tariff protection and imperfect competition, in:
Monopolistic competition and international trade, ed. H. Kierzkowski (Clarendon
Press, Oxford).
DeGraba, P., 1990, Input market price discrimination and the choice of technology,
American Economic Review 80, 1246-1253.
Gatsios, K.,1990, Preferential tariffs and the 'Most Favored Nation1 principle: a note,
Journal of International Economics 28, 365-373.
Helpman, E. and P. Krugman, 1989, Trade policy and market structure (MTT Press,
Cambridge).
Hwang, H. and C. Mai, 1991, Optimum discriminatory tariffs under oligopolistic
competition, Canadian Journal of Economics 24, 693-702.
